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Abstract 
Where policy ends are contested and means for change are ambiguous, imposing central 
targets on local organisations – what we call hierarchist governance – is problematic. 
The concept of experimentalist governance suggests that target-setting should rather be 
a learning process between central regulators and local organisations. However, the 
relationship between experimentalist and hierarchist governance remains unclear. 
Existing literature suggests that the learning-oriented experimentalist logic is hard to 
reconcile with a hierarchist logic focussed on accountability for results. We examine 
whether complementary use of hierarchist and experimentalist ideas is possible. 
Drawing on experiences from Scotland, we find that experimentalist and hierarchist 
logics can co-exist in the same performance management system. Each logic served 
distinct roles with respect to target-setting, implementation and accountability. The 
emphasis on experimentalism was stronger where ends and means were contested (the 
case of shifting the balance of care for older people) than where both ends and means 
seemed obvious initially (the case of healthcare-associated infections, where target-
setting followed a more hierarchist logic). However, governance drifted towards 
experimentalism when rising rates of community-acquired infections decreased clarity 
about effective interventions. The nature of policy issues and changes therein over time 
appear to be important conditions for synergies between governance logics.  
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1. Introduction 
Targets are used in many health systems to focus managerial attention on 
priority areas for improvement and, by providing an explicit standard for 
evaluation, to promote accountability for results (Wismar et al., 2008, Smith and 
Busse, 2010). However, the top-down imposition of targets by central 
government on local organisations has attracted criticism (Carter, 1989, Bevan 
and Hood, 2006). This form of governance by targets – what we call hierarchist 
governance – requires ‘dials’ (Carter, 1989): accurate measures of performance 
which unambiguously represent desired policy ends (Bevan and Hood, 2006) 
and whose means of attainment are available to the organisations under 
scrutiny (Jacobs et al., 2006). For many issues in health policy, however, goals 
are contested and means for change are ambiguous. For such ‘wicked’ problems 
(Rittel and Webber, 1973), performance indicators are mere ‘tin openers’: 
measures which ‘do not give answers but prompt interrogation and inquiry, and 
by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate picture’ (Carter, 1989, p. 
134).  
 
The concept of experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) suggests 
that when the ‘correct’ targets and means for change are ambiguous, target-
setting should rather be conceptualised as a learning process between central 
and local organisations.  However, the relationship between experimentalist 
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and hierarchist governance is still unclear (Fossum, 2012). The wider 
performance management literature has questioned the extent to which 
measurement for learning and improvement can be fostered alongside demands 
for accountability for results (Freeman, 2002), suggesting these logics are 
incompatible.  This study, in contrast, examines the potential for 
complementarity of hierarchist and experimentalist governance, in the sense 
that they align and add value to each other. We investigate two research 
questions: 
1. Can hierarchist and experimentalist elements co-exist and complement 
each other in the same healthcare target system? 
2. Does the relative emphasis on experimentalist as opposed to hierarchist 
logics differ between policy issues depending on the degree of perceived 
ambiguity over ends and means?  
 
This study contributes to knowledge as follows. First, we examine a system (the 
Scottish HEAT target system) whose socio-historical context is favourable to 
any potential complementarity between hierarchism and experimentalism. As 
McDermott et al. (2015) suggest, a precondition for such complementarity 
includes long-standing collaborative relationships between central and local 
organisations within a hierarchically administered health system. As we 
describe in section 3.1., the Scottish HEAT target system meets these conditions.  
 
Second, we follow-up on Sabel and Zeitlin’s (2012) hypothesis that 
experimentalism will evolve for policy issues whose ends and means are 
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ambiguous. In turn, where ends and means are relatively clear, a more 
hierarchist approach may serve to foster common standards of practice.  While 
existing research has shown between-country differences in target-based 
governance (Wismar et al., 2008, Blackman et al., 2009, Bevan, 2010), we find 
that within-country variations in governance style exist at the level of policy 
issues. 
 
The next section contrasts theoretical assumptions underpinning hierarchist 
and experimentalist governance, reviews the rationale for exploring the scope 
for complementarity between them, and highlights potential barriers to 
complementariy. In the empirical analysis, we compare the development of 
targets for two policy issues in the Scottish HEAT target system. Implications for 
policy and research are discussed. 
 
2. Theoretical and policy background  
2.1. Setting targets: Hierarchist versus experimentalist governance 
Drawing on principal-agent theory, hierarchist target-setting (Table 1) became 
a key policy instrument under New Public Management reforms pursued in 
various countries since the 1980s (Hood, 2007). It is vividly illustrated by the 
model of ‘targets and terror’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006) adopted by the English 
Labour Government between 2001 and 2005 where public sector organisations 
were subject to strict performance targets with severe consequences for failure. 
 
5 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012; Table 1) has evolved as a 
critique of the assumptions underlying the hierarchist perspective (Table 1) in 
parallel to calls for more deliberation in public management (e.g. Barzelay, 
1992, Hood and Jackson, 1994). Conceived as a ‘learning process’, 
experimentalist governance links four elements in an iterative cycle: (i) Centre 
and local actors agree on broad goals and metrics to ascertain their 
achievement; (ii) local actors pursue these goals in their own way while the 
Centre provides support; (iii) local actors report their performance regularly, 
engage in peer review and share learning about ‘what works’; (iv) affected 
actors periodically revise goals and means following the results of the review 
process (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 170).  
 
Experimentalist governance was developed to understand how multilevel 
governance structures in uncertain and heterogeneous contexts can improve 
performance. This includes complex regulatory settings such as child protective 
services (Noonan et al., 2009) and policy-making in the European Union on 
areas such as social protection, telecommunications, drug and food safety where 
the interdependency of member states, the European Commission and other 
stakeholders often precludes formal rule-making (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, 
Fierlbeck, 2014). In these contexts, the increasing  use of ‘open norms’ (broad 
objectives and high level regulatory principles) reflects the need to avoid clear 
and precise rules in order to deal with regulatory uncertainty (Hocepied and de 
Streel, 2005). 
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2.2. Why explore the scope for complementarity between hierarchist and 
experimentalist governance?  
Complementarity implies that certain entities (here, logics of target-setting) 
come together in a synergistic way. Since each logic retains its essential 
characteristics, complementarity is thought to enable a broader spectrum of 
policy responses (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013) and to balance the limitations of a 
single model only (Goddard et al., 2000). Below we review key limitations of 
hierarchist governance with respect to target-setting, implementation, and 
accountability. We highlight why experimentalism may offer an effective 
complement but not necessarily a substitute. 
 
With regard to target-setting, where ideal ends of policy are contested, 
experimentalist governance scholars claim that argument offers a better basis 
for decision-making than authority (Pires, 2011). Because local organisations 
have an insight into frontline problems that national oversight bodies lack, it is 
argued that ‘global and local knowledge are mutually corrective, not 
hierarchically ordered’ (Sabel, 2004, p. 181). However, insofar as governments 
have a legitimate mandate to define priorities (Mays, 2006, Smith and Busse, 
2010), the experimentalist proposal of joint target-setting seems to contradict 
existing lines of accountability between government and subordinate 
administrations. Thus, while the engagement of local stakeholders, as called for 
by experimentalist governance, may be a valuable or even an essential strategy 
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to develop targets for ‘wicked’ problems, it may not be desirable to abandon 
hierarchist stewardship of the system entirely.  
 
Where means for implementation are ambiguous, the hierarchist approach 
provides no process how to achieve targets. Consequently, local organisations 
tend to develop various coping strategies (Lawton et al., 2000) but there is not 
necessarily an attempt to share learning across contexts. Experimentalist 
governance addresses this limitation by promoting local ‘experiments’ and 
mutual exchange about different approaches taken, so as to identify and scale-
up good practice (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). However, where effective 
interventions are known or become clearer over time (e.g. after a period of 
deliberative learning), regulatory authorities can codify and enforce common 
standards of practice, subject to dynamic revision. Hierarchist regulation thus 
retains a key role (Eberlein 2010).  
 
In terms of accountability, the hierarchist view of accountability for results 
implies the need to comprehensively specify goals. Since most public services 
have multiple goals, incomplete contracts combined with divergent interests 
and informational asymmetries risk encouraging gaming by local organisations 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006) and misinterpretation of complex local production 
processes by regulators (Smith, 1995). In search of complete contracts, reforms 
in England and the Netherlands have led to a multiplication of quantitative 
indicators so as to cover ‘every’ aspect of performance, thereby overwhelming 
the capacities of central and local organisations (Power, 1999, Pollitt et al., 
2010). Experimentalism, in contrast, is seen to limit the need for a variety of 
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indicators since it strives to understand how targets are implemented (Noonan 
et al. 2009; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). Nevertheless, within a publicly funded 
health system, ignoring demands for accountability for results in efforts to 
improve performance seems unrealistic (Ernst et al., 2008). 
 
The above review suggests that hierarchist and experimentalist governance 
have different potential strengths and limitations with respect to target-setting, 
implementation and accountability. Thus, there is a strong rationale to explore 
the scope for complementarity between them. 
 
2.3. Barriers to complementarity 
Is complementarity between hierarchist and experimentalist governance 
empirically feasible?  The wider healthcare performance management literature 
has tended to argue that ‘measurement for improvement’ (which underpins 
experimentalist governance) ought to be kept separate from ‘measurement for 
accountability for results’ (which underlies hierarchist governance). While the 
former is thought to require a culture of openness, using data that is good 
enough to diagnose and remedy problems, the latter is premised on a culture of 
judgment against fixed objectives, with a consequent need for accurate data 
(Solberg et al., 1997, Freeman, 2002, Davies, 2005). 
 
Such incompatibility of both logics, in the sense that regulators adopt either one 
or the other logic, but not elements of both, seems to be supported by empirical 
research on health targets. An international review of health targets in seven 
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European nations found that target-setting styles differed in terms of their focus 
on either hierarchist regulation and accountability, or more deliberative, 
learning-oriented stakeholder engagement (Ernst et al., 2008). The findings 
showed struggles in bringing these elements together: some nations fostered 
stakeholder consensus, but failed to achieve accountability (e.g. Germany, 
Flanders) while others established strong regulatory frameworks focussed on 
accountability for results yet omitted local ownership (e.g. England) (Ernst et 
al., 2008).  
 
However, it is not known to what extent these findings reflect a general 
incompatibility between these approaches to target governance, or specific 
features of the health systems examined.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. System context and study design 
Scotland offers a suitable context to examine experimentalist governance ideas 
within a hierarchical system. The planning and delivery of health services is 
delegated to 14 territorial NHS Boards who are responsible for £10.9 billion (of 
£11.9 billion Government spending on health in 2012/13; Audit Scotland 
(2013). But while NHS Boards are major budget-holders and have considerable 
powers to shape patterns of service delivery, they remain directly accountable 
to Scottish ministers and subject to central constraints such as the requirement 
to break even in each financial year (Steel and Cylus, 2012). 
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The model of governance of the Scottish NHS immediately after devolution in 
1999 has been described as one of trust and altruism since local organisations 
were trusted to deliver a high-quality service (Bevan et al., 2014). Ministers 
have long eschewed targets or rankings that inflict reputational damage, 
rejecting top-down performance management in favour of a consensual 
approach with local managers and clinical leaders (Greer, 2004). The relational 
distance between central and local organisations is low (Hood, 2007). Senior 
managers from the different regions ‘meet regularly and have easy access to 
ministers and officials in the Scottish Government’ (Steel and Cylus 2012, p. 26).  
 
Targets for territorial Boards were first introduced in 2002, in the form of the 
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) (Scottish Executive Health 
Department 2003). The exact number of targets was perceived to be opaque as 
the PAF referred to multiple policy frameworks; estimates range between a 
hundred and over two hundred targets. An evaluation concluded that there was 
an ‘overload from the data collection (…) and the risk that PAF might become an 
end in itself’ since it lacked incentives for Boards to improve and share good 
practice (Farrar et al., 2004). 
 
This changed in 2006 when, as Steel and Cylus state, ‘[u]nfavourable cross-
border comparisons (…) about performance, particularly on waiting times’ 
(2012, p. 113) and a change in minister led to the introduction of a ‘tougher and 
more sophisticated approach to performance management’ (2012, p. 114); 
known as the HEAT (Health improvement, Efficiency, Access and Treatment 
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appropriateness) target system. Within a hierarchical yet consensual context, 
this system offers a suitable context to investigate the potential 
complementarity of hierarchist and experimentalist governance (our first 
research question).  
 
To examine the balance between hierarchist and experimentalist logics 
contingent on the nature of the policy issue (our second research question), we 
compare the development of HEAT targets for two policy issues. These policy 
issues were selected based on two criteria. The first criterion was to represent 
opposite ends on a spectrum of ambiguity over goals and means (Table 2). 
 For the case of healthcare-associated infections (HAI), where both ideal 
performance and the means for change were relatively well-known when 
targets were introduced, one would expect a more hierarchist logic. 
 For the case of shifting the balance of care for older people (SBC), where 
both the ideal ends and the means for change were ambiguous, one would 
expect a more experimentalist logic. 
Table 2 about here  
 
The second criterion for selecting these two policy issues is methodological: 
Targets were introduced in 2006 (SBC) and 2008 (HAI) and have evolved since 
then, thus enabling a comparison of their development over time.  
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3.2. Data collection and analysis 
The study triangulates multiple sources of data (Table 3). Interviewees were 
recruited following a purposive strategy (Patton, 2002) intended to (i) capture 
national and local experiences and (ii) represent diverse local contexts.  We 
started with an initial group of national and local managers and, using 
‘snowballing’, invited 33 people for interview. We included Boards from rural 
and remote areas (e.g. Highlands) and urban areas (e.g. Lothian); small Boards 
(e.g. Shetland, with a population of less than 20,000) and large Boards (e.g. 
Glasgow, with a population of over 1 million); and Boards who performed 
comparatively well and poorly on targets for the two policy issues, since we 
expected these aspects to potentially influence the perception of targets. 
 
In total, 31 interviews were conducted between June 2014 and February 2015 
(two people declined due to time constraints), audio-recorded and transcribed. 
We considered data saturation to be achieved when no new themes emerged 
after a couple of further interviews (Guest et al., 2006). Participants were 
informed about the aims of the study, encouraged to ask questions and assured 
of the anonymity of their responses. The first author’s institutional review 
committee granted ethics approval. 
 
Based on the theoretical constructs from hierarchist and experimentalist 
governance, directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) was used. 
This enabled theory triangulation as each case was examined through different 
theoretical lenses (Patton, 2002). The first author collected and analysed the 
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data (using NVivo). The second author supervised this process and, through 
regular discussions, contributed to the iterative refinement of the 
interpretations. To mitigate against misinterpretation, we shared the findings 
with the interviewees who were asked to point out any factual errors. 
 
Table 3 about here  
4. Findings  
The next sections analyse the HEAT target system and special features in the 
governance of HAI and SBC. Specifically, we investigate how approaches to 
target-setting, implementation and accountability, introduced above, reflect 
hierarchist or experimentalist logics (for a summary, see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 about here  
  
4.1 The HEAT target system: Commonalities across targets 
4.1.1. Target-setting 
The choice of HEAT targets is informed by consultations with service user 
groups, professional associations and NHS Boards. Some targets arise from 
political manifesto commitments. Three explicit criteria exist for selecting HEAT 
targets: (i) alignment with Government priorities; (ii) availability of baseline 
data; and (iii) scope for implementation by NHS Boards. Each target runs over 
three years, after which feedback meetings with NHS managers, health 
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professionals and Government officials enable the revision or abolition of 
targets. While the Scottish Government decides on targets (reflecting the 
hierarchist logic), stakeholders discuss areas where targets add value or cause 
problems (reflecting the experimentalist logic).  
4.1.2. Implementation 
The HEAT target process is led by a Directorate in the Scottish Government 
which agrees local delivery plans (LDPs) with each Board and monitors 
progress against these. In LDPs, Boards explain how they plan to attain the 
HEAT targets and the risks they face. A head of performance noted that ‘LDPs 
are a way to sensecheck with the Scottish Government and raise concerns we see 
locally’. This reflects the experimentalist logic insofar as LDPs may serve as a 
mechanism to help uncover local problems and management strategies. 
Nevertheless, LDPs are drafted in relation to national guidance and signed-off 
by the Government. Interviewees perceived LDPs primarily as the ‘contract’ 
between Government and Boards, reflecting a hierarchist orientation. 
4.1.3. Accountability 
The HEAT target system has institutionalised two routes to assure 
accountability. One is a summative assessment that reflects the hierarchist logic 
of accountability for results. The Government examines progress against the 
LDPs at Annual Reviews. In addition, biennial Accountability Reviews are held 
by ministers where members of the public can ask questions. These reviews 
result in a letter from the Cabinet Secretary about issues Boards are expected to 
address. National progress against the HEAT targets is reported publicly on the 
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Government’s website Scotland Performs. There are no financial sanctions or 
forced redundancies when targets are not met.  
 
The other route is a formative assessment that reflects the experimentalist view 
of accountability as valid processes. This takes the form of Mid-Year reviews to 
gauge if Boards are ‘on track’. Pressure for corrective action can be escalated 
through several mechanisms. At monthly meetings of Board Chief Executives 
with the NHS Chief Executive, performance is routinely discussed. Regular 
bilateral meetings take place between performance managers from the Scottish 
Government and Board staff. If there are concerns about a major failure, the 
Scottish government sends a performance support team to Boards to identify 
problems and remedial actions. However, interviewees highlighted a constant 
tension in the teams’ dual role of providing support and exercising Government 
control:  
 
‘Boards don’t have a choice (…) they must develop an action plan that is heavily 
scrutinised by the Scottish Government’ (Government official). 
 
‘The process is not comfortable (…) but from my experience it has been respectful 
and positive to diagnose problems we had (…) showing how other organisations 
solve them’ (senior manager). 
 
Government officials and local managers pointed out that accountability for 
results was a response to perceived opacity of the PAF. However, because this 
evolved within a broader context of public sector reform which emphasised the 
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value of partnership (see e.g. the report of the Commission on the Future 
Delivery of Public Services (2011)), there was also an increasing commitment 
by the Government to listen to local feedback. Below we explore these themes 
further with regard to HAI and SBC. 
 
4.2 Healthcare-associated infections: the quest for zero infections 
4.2.1 Policy context 
The issue of HAIs climbed the policy agenda in 2008 when an outbreak of 
clostridium difficile (CDI) at the Vale of Leven hospital resulted in a major 
revision of infection control practices. The Scottish Government’s HAI Taskforce 
set out a multifaceted approach to change, funded with £56 million for three 
years across five areas (HAI Taskforce, 2008): standards of practice; culture 
(resulting e.g. in a national hand hygiene campaign); education (e.g. on 
antibiotic prescribing); surveillance and audit (e.g. since 2009, the Healthcare 
Environment Inspectorate has carried out regular audits of compliance with 
national standards); and changes in the physical environment and processes 
(e.g. the introduction of MRSA screening on admission). Action on HAI was also 
embedded into the Scottish Patient Safety Programme, a national Collaborative 
aimed at improving patient safety. From the outset, there was thus a strong 
emphasis on national leadership. 
 
17 
 
4.2.2 Target-setting 
Starting in 2008, the HAI Taskforce recommended the introduction of a national 
HEAT target on Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (SABs, including MRSA and 
MSSA), based on the knowledge at that time that SABs represented a dominant 
cause of infection. A HEAT target on CDI followed in 2009, once baseline data 
from mandatory surveillance was available. Targets are proposed by a subgroup 
of the HAI Taskforce whose membership includes key professional groups 
(infection control managers, medical directors, and microbiologists employed 
by Boards). Proposals are passed to the Scottish Government for decision. While 
the Scottish Government thus retains the responsibility for setting targets 
(reflecting the hierarchist logic), proposals are initiated by the stakeholders 
who will implement them (reflecting the experimentalist logic).  
 
Target values, however, were derived from technical information rather than 
consensus; reflecting hierarchist ideas. Initially, targets aimed at a 30 percent 
reduction of HAIs over a five-year period. This was based on a seminal study on 
the prevention of nosocomial infection in the United States (Haley et al., 1985) 
which had found that a third of hospital infections was avoidable with a defined 
set of interventions including surveillance, having trained infection control staff, 
and a system for reporting infection rates to practising surgeons. Although this 
study came from a different context, it seemed “the best evidence and reference 
point at the time of potential for prevention” (HAI Taskforce representative). 
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Although an ideal rate is known for HAI (zero infections), uncertain effect sizes 
of interventions make it hard to ascertain what levels of quality are feasible in 
practice. With comparable data becoming available from standardised reporting 
from the United Kingdom and similar European health systems, since 2011 
levels of achievement are determined by ‘best-in-class’ benchmarking. In this 
system, the Government seeks to infer an attainable level of quality for NHS 
Boards from the best performers within Scotland and abroad. However, a key 
challenge was the choice of threshold. As a manager from a poorer performing 
Board highlighted: “We argued that the lowest observed rate would not be 
achievable for all (…) given differences in baseline performance between Boards”. 
Following consultations with Boards, the HAI Taskforce thus agreed on the 
roughly 75th percentile of the distribution of HAI rates as the minimum target. 
Those performing better were expected to continue to improve to prevent 
regression towards this minimum target. 
 
4.2.3 Implementation and accountability: the challenge of community-
acquired infections 
Since Boards have integrated responsibility for acute, primary and community 
care, the national target includes all cases of HAI regardless of where they have 
been acquired. Boards’ actions have traditionally focused on hospitals: LDPs 
over the past years emphasise the education of hospital staff to prevent the 
transmission of infections. Implementation has focussed on national standards 
of practice and ‘care-bundles’, which consist of a standardised set of actions 
health professionals are expected to follow to prevent infections. While the local 
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implementation of these measures required, as interviewees commented, much 
discussion and testing with local staff (reflecting an experimentalist 
orientation), standards of practice were defined at the national level and 
provided common definitions of what constitutes “appropriate care” (reflecting 
a hierarchist orientation). 
 
However, while significant reductions in HAI have led to increasingly stringent 
targets consistent with the “best-in-class” approach, Boards’ LDPs record 
challenges from a rising proportion of community-acquired infections (CA-HAIs; 
defined as infections that develop within 48 hours after patient admission to 
hospital). In interviews, local managers commented that, from their experience, 
CA-HAIs were considerably harder to prevent than hospital-acquired HAIs 
because causal pathways were frequently unknown. As an infection control 
manager explained: “Hospitals have  clear physical and managerial boundaries 
(…) but in the community, we often do not know where infections come from”. 
Mentioned by three Boards in 2007/08, by 2013/14, all Boards identified CA-
HAIs as a key risk to meeting national targets. For instance, NHS Tayside’s LDPs 
record that by 2013/14 about 50 percent of SABs were present on admission to 
hospital, an increase from about 22 percent of SABs in 2006/07. 
 
In analysing national and local responses to this development, two major 
themes emerge.  First, despite a changing problem frame, there appeared to be 
continuity. According to local LDPs, between 2009/10 and 2013/14, all Boards 
maintained their focus on hospitals in controlling HAIs. As a local manager 
explained: “We must keep HAIs on the agenda in hospitals, not shift all attention 
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to the community (…) to sustain the successes we have seen”. Similarly, national 
guidance on infection control has been reaffirmed. 
 
Second, however, there appeared to be an increasing emphasis on other 
approaches to implementation and accountability. This is reflected in the role 
ascribed to central-local dialogue. As an  infection control manager put it: “There 
has always been some dialogue with Government representatives about infection 
rates (…) but understanding the causes has become more important with the 
growing proportion of community-acquired infections”. A recent and notable 
manifestation of this dialogue – which is not documented in the LDPs, but 
emerged in the interviews – was that Scottish Government leads have started to 
regularly attend local HAI meetings and share experiences from other Boards. 
As a local manager explained: “We were struggling with community-acquired 
infections and the Government teams said to us, ‘you might speak to Board x and y 
about this’ (...) this was not a panacea but it was a start” .  
 
A related development concerns the diffusion of tools which – unlike the afore-
mentioned standards of practice – do not prescribe desirable behaviour but 
rather offer an analytic process. A pertinent example is the use of root-cause 
analysis (RCA), intended to trace back infections to their initial source and, thus, 
understand the onset of CA-HAIs. In 2009/10, three Boards reported using RCA 
in their LDPs. By 2013/14, eleven Boards had taken up RCA. As a consequence, 
several Boards have started to reach out beyond hospitals towards identifed 
high-risk settings such as care homes and to engage general practitioners and 
district nurses in efforts to tackle CA-HAIs.  
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4.2.4 Conclusion 
The perception of HAI as an issue where national standards where both feasible 
and desirable resulted in centrally determined targets; reflecting a hierarchist 
orientation. Nevertheless, Boards were consulted and their feedback was acted 
upon in the specification of target values. This implies the experimentalist 
concept of joint target-setting between central and local organisations. 
Implementation has focused on the more hierarchist notion of standardised 
interventions. However, the reframing of the boundaries of the problem from 
hospitals to the wider community led to more learning-oriented approaches to 
implementation and accountability. This can be interpreted as a partial 
transformation towards experimentalism. 
 
 
4.3 Care for older people: the quest for the right  ‘balance’ 
4.3.1. Policy context 
Shifting care out of hospitals into the community became a key policy focus in 
2005, when the Scottish Government launched the Unscheduled Care 
Collaborative to reduce emergency admissions especially among older people. 
The Collaborative framework (Scottish Executive, 2005, p.3) set out the 
principle that: ‘change will not be delivered by issuing guidance and directives (…) 
one size does not fit all. Solutions must meet local need and circumstance and 
more importantly actively engage staff’. The Government’s (2009a) strategic 
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framework Shifting the balance of care re-emphasised shifting the location of 
care (outside hospitals), its focus (from acute to preventive care) and 
responsibility for its delivery (involving non-medical professionals, patients and 
carers). These concepts were affirmed in successive policies. Thus, from the 
outset, policy discourse emphasised local diversity and stakeholder 
engagement. 
 
4.3.2. Target-setting 
To serve as strategic measure in support of these policies, in 2006, a HEAT 
target on reducing multiple re-admissions to hospital for people aged 65 and 
over was introduced. After the usual three-year cycle, a national stakeholder 
event including Government officials, clinicians, service users and Boards 
concluded that some admissions might be unavoidable. ‘Clinicians were 
concerned this target would create a perverse incentive to prevent even necessary 
admissions (...) based on that feedback, the target was reformulated’ (clinical 
lead). In 2009, a target to reduce emergency bed days for people aged 65 (later 
narrowed to those aged 75) and over was introduced to clarify the underlying 
policy ambition: ‘The target is about minimising the time spent in hospital for 
older people (...) patient experience of care and health status often suffer as a 
result of long hospital stays’ (medical director).  
 
The Government agreed levels of achievement bilaterally with each Board, 
because imposing a single national target was perceived as “untenable due to 
local variations in the availability of community care, socio-demographic 
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composition, and previous reductions in emergency bed days” (Government 
official).  
 
Experimentalism would suggest that setting targets through dialogue requires a 
mutual interest in obtaining challenging yet feasible targets. Since HEAT targets 
are publicly reported and frequently cited to underpin political achievements, 
one would expect the Scottish Government to have an interest in targets that 
can be met. However, emergency care puts increasing strain on the NHS budget 
and rising demand due to demographic changes challenges the Government’s 
pledge to protect universal coverage (Barbour et al., 2014). This has led to a 
perception that “the situation is unsustainable and there is a real need to reorient 
health services” (Government official), suggesting a commitment to move 
beyond merely symbolic targets. The incentive for Boards to identify a credible 
trajectory was, according to our respondents, both improved patient experience 
and financial sustainability, which is heavily scrutinised by ministers, Audit 
Scotland and the Scottish Parliament. The Joint Improvement Team (JIT; a 
partnership involving the Scottish Government, NHSScotland, the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), and the Third, Independent and Housing 
sectors) helped to build this argument: JIT provided Boards with estimates of 
future needs for hospital beds given demographic projections to show how 
reducing bed days now would mitigate the creation of new hospital beds in the 
future.  
 
The national target of achieving a 12 percent reduction in emergency bed days 
between 2009/10 and 2014/15 was derived from the aggregation of Board-
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specific targets. These ranged from 0 percent (for Boards with a relatively low 
rate of bed days who felt further reductions were not feasible) to about 20 
percent over a five-year period (in Grampian, where larger-scale service 
redesign was under development). Both national and local respondents 
perceived the process as dialogical rather than adversarial: 
 
‘We cannot just set the trajectory as we like (...) we look at our historical data and 
suggest what we can do (...) then the Government says “we think you can do more 
here” or “you are too ambitious”and then we go back to the data (...) it is a 
dialogue really’ (planning manager). 
 
‘Some Boards seemed very ambitious (...) but some also had an ambitious 
improvement programme so the trajectory was backed up (...) it was a lot about 
speaking to Boards’ (Scottish Government official). 
 
4.3.3. Implementation and accountability 
Fundamental problems in SBC – and initial differences to HAI – were the limited 
evidence of effective interventions, local diversity and Boards’ partial 
ownership of targets. These differences appeared to influence the approaches to 
both implementation and accountability.  
 
Between 2008 and 2011, a national Long-Term Conditions Collaborative 
provided information about various tools to improve care pathways (e.g. 
predictive modelling, anticipatory care plans and intermediate models of care) 
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and sought to support NHS Boards in adapting relevant tools to their own local 
contexts (The Scottish Government, 2009b). In 2010, the 10-year programme 
Reshaping Care for Older People (The Scottish Government, 2010) established a 
£70 million Change Fund to finance innovative projects through local 
partnerships involving acute, community, third and independent sectors. Some 
of the resulting local interventions reflect different approaches to essentially the 
same problem. For instance, since the capacity and quality of social care, funded 
by local authorities, affects Boards’ ability to reduce emergency admissions and 
achieve timely discharges into community care, all Boards emphasised 
collaborations with local authorities. However, specific local projects differ in 
their focus on, amongst others, joint standards for discharge management or 
expanded access to community and residential care. Other interventions 
appeared to be driven by context-specific challenges. For instance, rural and 
remote Boards have put particular emphasis on testing new models of 
telehealth and telecare.   
 
As Audit Scotland (2014) highlights, the focus on local innovation has struggled 
with the challenge of ensuring national accountability, in particular with regard 
to the systematic evaluation of “good practice” and its subsequent “scale-up and 
spread” in a heterogeneous system. Recently, national organisations have 
started to address this challenge by promoting national learning events and 
benchmarking (see e.g. JIT 2014) and the sharing of case studies (QuEST 2014). 
Local managers we interviewed noted that these case studies were increasingly 
valued as offering inspiration – rather than prescription - for local action.  
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4.2.5 Conclusion 
Shifting the balance of care for older people was from the outset recognised as 
an issue of local diversity and uncertainty about effective interventions. As a 
result, governance focussed on Board-specific targets, innovative models of care 
and local partnerships, and attempts to share learning. This approach reflects 
core principles associated with experimentalist governance.  
5. Discussion  
Prompted by the limits of a hierarchist approach to setting targets for policy 
issues whose ‘ideal’ ends and means for change are ambiguous, we have 
examined whether complementary use of hierarchist and experimentalist ideas 
is possible.  
 
Returning to our research questions, the findings suggest the following. First, 
hierarchist and experimentalist elements can be shown to exist in the same 
performance management regime (Table 4). Experimentalism adds distinct 
aspects to target-setting, implementation, and accountability that are missing 
from a purely hierarchist approach (Table 1). In Scotland, this has led to a 
system where: central and local actors contribute to setting targets; central 
bodies support local attempts to implement change; and local actors are held 
accountable both for processes and for results. This suggests a complementary 
role of experimentalism (Fossum, 2012). Nevertheless, there is also some 
evidence of tension between the logics. This is illustrated by the ambivalent 
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perception of Government performance support teams with their dual mandate 
for central control and local support.  
 
Second, while both logics co-existed at the HEAT system level, their relative 
emphasis differed between policy issues and also over time within a policy 
issue. Where targets were informed by the vision of an optimal balance between 
community and hospital care and means for change were ambiguous (care for 
older people; Table 2), governance styles reflected experimentalist ideas more 
strongly. Where ends and means were known initially (HAI; Table 2), targets 
followed a more hierarchist logic. When the rise of community-acquired 
infections decreased clarity about effective interventions, the ideal level of HAI 
(zero) and the model for target-setting remained constant. However, a more 
learning-oriented approach to implementation and accountability ensued 
(Table 4). This can be interpreted as a partial drift in governance style to the 
experimentalist realm (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 about here 
 
The main implication of these findings is that the distinct combination of 
governance logics can be adapted on a target-by-target basis. Thinking of 
hierarchism and experimentalism as a property of the performance 
management system as a whole may be analytically too coarse (from a research 
perspective) and neglect opportunities that arise from drawing on both logics 
(from a policy perspective). As this study shows, it is important to look deeper 
at differences between policy issues and at dynamics over time.  
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Our study setting, the Scottish HEAT target system, was chosen explicitly 
because we expected it to be receptive to complementarity between 
hierarchism and experimentalism. Its socio-historical and administrative 
context is characterised by longstanding collaboration between central and 
local organisations alongside a well-developed central-local accountability 
relationship (McDermott et al., 2015). Our finding that it is possible to combine 
experimentalism and hierarchism may thus not be easily transferable to 
systems which do not meet these conditions. In countries where administrative 
competencies are dispersed between actors, hierarchist target-setting is less 
likely to play a key role and an experimentalist governance logic may be the 
only feasible approach to set targets at all. In turn, however, experimentalism is 
likely to flourish only if it is possible to develop the infrastructure and 
willingness to encourage local freedom to innovate, with requisite financial and 
managerial support, and then share experiences across the system.  
 
Overall, our findings highlight the need for policy and research to reconsider the 
strict separation between ‘measurement for improvement’ and ‘measurement 
for accountability’ (Solberg et al., 1997, Freeman, 2002, Davies, 2005). The 
experiences from Scotland lead us to conclude that both purposes can co-exist 
within a system. Setting targets does not have to end up in ‘targets and terror’ 
but may combine stakeholder engagement with accountability for results. This 
is an important contribution to existing research which found the hierarchist 
approach to target-setting, focussed on accountability for results, and the 
learning- and engagement-oriented approach to target-setting, which reflects 
experimentalist ideas, in separate countries but not in the same system (Ernst et 
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al. 2008). We have shown that the nature of policy issues and changes therein 
over time are important conditions for synergies between governance logics. 
Future research might further explore the enabling conditions for and outcomes 
of combining multiple logics of target governance within different institutional 
contexts. 
30 
 
References 
Audit Scotland (2013). NHS financial performance 2012/13, Edinburgh, Audit Scotland. 
Audit Scotland (2014). Reshaping care for older people, Edinburgh, Audit Scotland. 
Barbour, J., Morton, A. & Schang, L. (2014). The Scottish NHS: meeting the financial 
challenge ahead. Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary, 38, 126-146. 
Barzelay, M. (1992). Breaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in 
Government, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 
Bevan, G. (2010). Performance Measurement of "Knights" and "Knaves": Differences in 
Approaches and Impacts in British Countries after Devolution. Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis, 12, 33-56. 
Bevan, G. & Hood, C. (2006). What's measured is what matters: Targets and gaming in 
the English public health care system. Public Administration, 84, 517-538. 
Bevan, G., Karanikolos, M., Exley, J., Nolte, E., Connolly, S. & Mays, N. (2014). The four 
health systems of the United Kingdom: how do they compare?, London, The 
Health Foundation and The Nuffield Trust. 
Blackman, T., Elliott, E., Greene, A., Harrington, B., Hunter, D., Marks, L., McKee, L., 
Smith, K. & Williams, G. (2009). Tackling Health Inequalities in Post-Devolution 
Britain: Do Targets Matter? Public Administration, 87, 762-778. 
Carter, N. (1989). Performance Indicators - Backseat Driving or Hands Off Control. 
Policy and Politics, 17, 131-138. 
Commission on the future delivery of public services (2011). Report on the Future 
Delivery of Public Services by the Commission chaired by Dr Campbell Christie, 
Cheadle Heath, APS Group Scotland. 
Davies, H. (2005). Measuring and reporting the quality of health care: issues and 
evidence from the international research literature, Edinburgh, NHS Quality 
Improvement Scotland. 
Eberlein, B. (2010). Experimentalist Governance in the European Energy Sector. In: 
Sabel, CF., Zeitlin, J. (eds). Experimentalist Governance in the European Union. 
Oxford: OUP. 
Ernst, K., Wismar, M., Busse, R. & McKee, M. (2008). Improving the Effectiveness of 
Health Targets. In: Wismar, M., McKee, M., Ernst, K., Srivastava, D. & BUSSE, R. 
(eds.) Health Targets in Europe: Learning from experience. Copenhagen: World 
Health Organisation, on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies. 
Farrar, S., Harris, F., Scott, T. & McKee, L. (2004). The Performance Assessment 
Framework: experiences and perceptions of NHSScotland, A Report to the 
Analytical Service Division, Directorate of Performance Management and 
Finance, Scottish Executive Health Department. 
Fierlbeck, K. (2014). The changing contours of experimental governance in European 
health care. Social Science & Medicine, 108, 89-96. 
Fischer, M. & Ferlie, E. (2013). Resisting hybridisation between modes of clinical risk 
management: Contradiction, contest, and the production of intractable conflict. 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, 38, 30-49. 
Fossum, J. E. (2012). Reflections on experimentalist governance. Regulation & 
Governance, 6, 394-400. 
Freeman, T. (2002). Using performance indicators to improve health care quality in the 
public sector: a review of the literature. Health Services Management Research, 
15, 126-37. 
31 
 
Goddard, M., Mannion, R. & Smith, P. (2000). Enhancing performance in health care: a 
theoretical perspective on agency and the role of information. Health 
Economics, 9, 95-107. 
Greer, S. (2004). Territorial Politics and Health Policy. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Guest, G., Bunce, A. & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An 
experiment with data saturation and variability. Field Methods, 18, 59-82. 
HAI Taskforce (2008). Healthcare Associated Infection Taskforce Delivery Plan April 
2008 to March 2011, 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/(2008/03/07110818/0 [5 April 
2014]. 
Haley, R. W., Culver, D. H., White, J. W., Morgan, W. M., Emori, T. G., Munn, V. P. & 
Hooton, T. M. (1985). The Efficacy of Infection Surveillance and Control 
Programs in Preventing Nosocomial Infections in United-States Hospitals. 
American Journal of Epidemiology, 121, 182-205. 
Hocepied, C. & A. de Streel (2005). The ambiguities of the European electronic 
communications  regulation. In: E.J. Dommering  and N.A.N.M. van Eijk (eds), 
The Round Table Expert Group on Telecommunications Law, University of 
Amsterdam, pp. 139-190. 
Hood, C. (2007). Public service management by numbers: Why does it vary? Where has 
it come from? What are the gaps and the puzzles? Public Money & Management, 
27, 95-102. 
Hood, C. & Jackson, M. (1994). Keys for Locks in Administrative Argument. 
Administration & Society, 25, 467-488. 
Hsieh, H. F. & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. 
Qual Health Res, 15, 1277-88. 
Jacobs, R., Martin, S., Goddard, M., Gravelle, H. & Smith, P. (2006). Exploring the 
determinants of NHS performance ratings: lessons for performance assessment 
systems. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 11, 211-217. 
JIT (Joint Improvement Team) (2014). Annual Report 2013/14, Edinburgh, Joint 
Improvement Team. 
Johnston, L., Lardner, C. & Jepson, R. (2008). Overview of evidence relating to shifting the 
balance of care: a contribution to the knowledge base, Edinburgh, Scottish 
Government Social Research. 
Lawton, A., Mckevitt, D. & Millar, M. (2000). Coping with ambiguity: Reconciling 
external legitimacy and organisational implementation in performance 
measurement. Public Money & Management, 20, 13-19. 
Mays, N. (2006). Use of Targets to Improve Health System Performance: English NHS 
Experience and Implications for New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand 
Treasury. 
Mcdermott, A., Hamel, L., Steel, D., Flood, P. & McKee, L. (2015). Hybrid healthcare 
governance for improvement? Combining top-down and bottom-up approaches 
to public sector regulation. Public Administration 93(2), 324-344 
NHS Tayside (2011). LDP Risk Management Plan 2011/12, Dundee, NHS Tayside. 
Noonan, K. G., Sabel, C. F. & Simon, W. H. (2009). Legal Accountability in the Service-
Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform. Law and Social 
Inquiry-Journal of the American Bar Foundation, 34, 523-568. 
Patton, M. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods, Thousand Oaks, Sage  
Pires, R. (2011). Beyond the fear of discretion: Flexibility, performance, and 
accountability in the management of regulatory bureaucracies. Regulation & 
Governance, 5, 43–69. 
32 
 
Pollitt, C., Harrison, S., Dowswell, G., Jerak-Zuiderent, S. & Bal, R. (2010). Performance 
Regimes in Health Care: Institutions, Critical Junctures and the Logic of 
Escalation in England and the Netherlands. Evaluation, 16, 13-29. 
Power, M. (1999). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
QUEST (Quality AND Efficiency Support Team) (2014). Annual Report (2013: Reporting 
on the Quality and Efficiency Support Team, Edinburgh, The Scottish 
Government. 
Rittel, H. W. J. & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. 
Policy Sciences, 4, 155-169. 
Sabel, C. (2004). Beyond principal-agent governance: experimentalist organisations, 
learning and accountability. In: Engelen, E. & Sie Dhian Ho, M. (eds.) De staat 
van de democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, pp. 173-196. 
Sabel, C. & Zeitlin, J. (2012). Experimentalist Governance. In: Levi-Faur, D. (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 169-183. 
Sabel, C. F. & Zeitlin, J. (2008). Learning from difference: The new architecture of 
experimentalist governance in the EU. European Law Journal, 14, 271-327. 
Scottish Executive (2005). The Unscheduled Care Collaborative Programme, Edinburgh, 
Scottish Executive. 
Smith, P. (1995). On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in 
the public sector. International Journal of Public Administration, 18, 277-310. 
Smith, P. C. & Busse, R. (2010). Learning From the European Experience of Using 
Targets to Improve Population Health. Preventing Chronic Disease, 7(5): A102. 
Solberg, L. I., Mosser, G. & Mcdonald, S. (1997). The three faces of performance 
measurement: Improvement, accountability and research. Joint Commission 
Journal on Quality Improvement, 23, 135-147. 
Steel, D. & Cylus, J. (2012). United Kingdom (Scotland): Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition, 14, xv-xxii, 1-150. 
The Scottish Government (2009a). Improving Outcomes by Shifting the Balance of Care, 
Edinburgh, The Scottish Government. 
The Scottish Government (2009b). Long Term Conditions Collaborative. Programme 
2008-2011, Edinburgh, The Scottish Government. 
The Scottish GovernmenT (2010). Reshaping Care for Older People. A Programme of 
Change 2011 -2021, Edinburgh, The Scottish Government. 
Wismar, M., McKee, M., Ernst, K., Srivastava, D. & busse, R. (2008). Health Targets in 
Europe: Learning from experience, Copenhagen, World Health Organisation, on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 
33 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Hierarchist and experimentalist assumptions about performance targets 
Assumptions 
regarding 
Hierarchism   Experimentalism 
Ambiguity about 
ends:  
Target-setting  
  
Central government has a legitimate mandate to set 
targets for subordinate administrations. 
Knowledge about goals is contested, provisional and distributed between 
central and local actors. Therefore, target-setting should be a joint process 
between central and local actors. 
Ambiguity about 
means:  
Implementation of 
targets 
  Means for change are available to local agents. 
 The state designs contracts, incentivising agents to 
meet the targets and controlling the effects of 
asymmetric information about the effort of agents. 
 Means for change are ambiguous.  
 The state provides support, encourages mutual learning and spread of 
good practice. 
Accountability  Inspection of results and application of rewards and 
punishments. 
Inspection of validity of processes: frontline organisations review and 
explain the choices they make for running a programme. 
 
  
Sources: authors’ display based on Sabel and Zeitlin (2012); Pires (2011).
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Table 2 Case studies  
Policy issue End (ideal) Means Targets (examples) 
Healthcare-
associated 
infections 
(HAI) 
 
Zero 
infections 
Relatively good 
evidence of 
effective 
interventions 
(e.g. Haley et al., 
1985) 
Reduce by 2012/13 NHS Boards’ 
staphylococcus aureus bacteriamia 
(including MRSA) cases to 0.26 or less 
per 1,000 acute occupied bed days; 
and the rate of Clostridium difficile 
infections in patients aged 65 and 
over to 0.39 cases or less per 1,000 
total occupied bed days 
Shifting the 
balance of 
care for 
older 
people 
(SBC) 
 
Unknown 
balance 
between 
hospital and 
community 
care 
Service redesign 
– complex and 
little evidence 
(Johnston et al., 
2008) 
Reduce the rate of emergency 
inpatient bed days for people aged 75 
and over per 1,000 population, by at 
least 12% between 2009/10 and 
2014/15 
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Table 3 Data sources 
Data source Rationale 
National policy documents Policy context and 
developments  
112 Local Delivery Plans (from 2006/07 over seven years for all 
Boards)  
Historical, public documents 
agreed with the Government 
in which Boards set out 
risks and management 
strategies for each target 
31 semi-structured interviews lasting 35-90 minutes 
National level: 9 with Scottish Government officials and national 
organisations: Quality and Efficiency Support Team, HAI Taskforce, 
Health Protection Scotland, Joint Improvement Team 
Local level: 22 with senior and middle managers from NHS Boards: 
chief executives, heads of performance management, medical 
directors, infection control managers, and operational managers 
- 8 of 14 Boards: Greater Glasgow and Clyde; Borders; Tayside; 
Dumfries and Galloway; Shetland; Grampian; Forth Valley; 
Lothian 
- 2-4 interviews per Board to obtain different perspectives 
Perceptions not addressed 
in public documents 
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Table 4 Hierarchist and experimentalist governance elements in the Scottish HEAT target system   
 System level: HEAT framework Policy issue level  
 Reflects          
hierarchist logic 
Reflects 
experimentalist logic 
HAI SBC 
Target-setting  
 
The Government decides 
on target indicators. 
Boards and service user 
groups, and national  
groups with Board 
representatives can 
propose and/or 
comment on proposed 
indicators. 
 
Targets are revised after 
a three-year cycle. 
Target values were set centrally, 
reflecting a hierarchist orientation. 
Target values were developed 
through dialogue, reflecting an 
experimentalist orientation. 
Implementation  LDPs are negotiated as 
‘contract’ between 
Government and Boards. 
LDPs serve to identify 
risks and management 
strategies locally. 
National guidance defines standards 
for local action, reflecting a 
hierarchist orientation. 
With the rise of CA-HAIs: Emphasis 
on dialogue and networks to share 
good practice, collaborative research 
and involvement of community 
health professionals, reflecting an 
experimentalist orientation. 
Local innovation was funded 
through the Change Fund and 
is increasingly shared through 
case studies, reflecting an 
experimentalist orientation. 
Accountability  Target achievement is 
assessed at Annual 
Reviews and publicly 
reported. 
Diagnostic monitoring 
throughout the year 
serves to identify and 
remedy problems. 
With the rise of CA-HAIs: Emphasis 
on root-cause analysis and 
inspection of local clinical processes 
reflecting an experimentalist 
orientation. 
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Figure 1 Ambiguity over goals and means in relation to governance style 
 
 
 
 
